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COMMENTS
FEDERAL COURT INTERVENTION IN PENDING STATE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS-THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
YOUNGER v. HARRIS
The recent United States Supreme Court decision of Younger v. Harris'
along with its companion cases 2 represent the most significant development
in the area of federal-state court relations since the Court decided Dombrowski v. Pfister3 in 1965. Dombrowski created grave doubts over the continued validity of the long established public policy against federal court
interference with state court proceedings. Civil libertarians were quick to
seize upon the broad assertions in that case as support for their efforts toward expanding the concept of federal court intervention in state criminal
prosecutions. Though the Court was given the opportunity to reconcile the
conflicting interpretations over the significance of Dombrowski, it failed to
do so and basic doubts as to the true dimensions of that decision remained
unanswered until the Court decided Younger v. Harris and its companion
cases in February, 1971. Because Younger was expressly limited in its ap_plication to pending state criminal prosecutions, 4 this Comment in attempt1401 U.S. 37 (1971).
2
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez
v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis,
401 U.S. 216 (1971).
3380 U.S. 479 (1965).
4
Justice Black, speaking for the Court, carefully limited Younger:
.. . . We express no view about the circumstances under which federal couris
may act when there is no prosecution pending in state courts at the time the
federal proceeding is begun. 401 U.S. at 41.
Black failed to indicate what stages of the proceeding were to be considered a part
of a "prosecution pending.' The actual facts of Younger are in doubt and so are of
little help in making this determination. The three-judge district court indicated that
Harris had only been indicted and was awaiting trial at the time the federal suit was
filed. See Harris v. Younger, 291 F. Supp. 507, 509 (C.D. Cal. 1968). Justice Black, on
the other hand, stated that Harris had been indicted and "was actually being prosecuted"
at the time of the federal suit. 401 US. at 41. Justice Stewart's remarks in his concurring opinion failed to resolve this question. He added only that Younger would
not be controlling "when a federal court is asked to give injunctive or declaratory
relief from future state criminal prosecutions." 401 U.S. at 55 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Stewart went on to indicate that Younger v. Harris would have no application where
state civil proceedings were involved. Id.
Black also concluded in Younger that 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), the federal anti-injunction statute, would not be affected by this decision. Black noted that since this ruling
was based on the lack of equitable principles needed to invoke federal relief, there
[ 347 ]
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ing to assess the importance of that decision will be confined solely to the
developments in that area of the law.
I.

THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE

Basically, the abstention doctrine provides that the federal courts will refrain from interfering with state court proceedings until the state courts have
had an opportunity to fully adjudicate matters before them.5 The doctrine
is founded on considerations of federalism and is by its origin equitable in
nature. 6 The abstention doctrine is essentially a compromise in an attempt
by Congress and the federal courts to minimize the conflict and maximize
7
the efficiency between state and federal courts.

While there is disagreement among constitutional scholars as to the origins
of abstention as a concept,8 few will dispute the fact that its judicial development into a recognized doctrine did not begin until early in the twentieth
was no opportunity to determine whether section 2283 would control. 401 U.S. at 41.
Section 2283 is applicable only where the actual prosecution has begun. See note 12
infra.
5
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
Generally, four principles are given as the basis for the abstention doctrine: (1) A
desire to permit the state an opportunity to decide issues on the basis of state law, thus
avoiding the constitutional issue wherever possible; (2) To prevent unnecessary interference with the states in their efforts to administer their own laws; (3) To permit
the states the opportunity to resolve unanswered questions concerning state law; (4)
To provide over-burdened federal courts with some relief. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS 196 (2d ed. 1970).
6 Since it is essentially equitable in nature, the abstention doctrine, in the area of
criminal prosecutions, has strong support from the principle that courts of equity will
not act to restrain a criminal prosecution. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43
(1971).
The abstention doctrine is founded on considerations of comity-that federal courts
should give consideration to the sovereign status of the individual state. Comity, though
frequently referred to as a doctrine, is more properly a long-standing public policy.
See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 169-72 (1963).
7
See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); C. WRIGHT, supra note 5.
s The dispute apparently dates back to the early nineteenth century. A number of
writers, relying upon Chief Justice Marshall's pronouncements in Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), maintain that the concept of abstention was totally
foreign to our early constitutional jurists. See Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against
State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombroawski, 48 TExAs L. Rxv. 535, 537
(1970). Our present Court, on the other hand, speaking through the late Justice Black
has noted that "[slince the beginning of this country's history Congress has, subject
to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from
interference by federal courts." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
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century. 9 It was not until 1941 in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.'0 that
the doctrine was interpreted to its fullest extent. In that case the Court noted:
*

. .

[A] doctrine of abstention is appropriate to our federal system

whereby the federal courts "exercising a wise discretion," restrain their
authority because of "scrupulous regard for the rightful dependence
of the state governments" and for the smooth working of the federal

judiciary."
A. The "ExtraordinaryCircumstances"Exception
Both Congress and the Court, though persistent in the belief that traditional
policy considerations warranted noninterference in state proceedings, have
through necessity fashioned several exceptions to the abstention doctrine.12
With respect to state criminal prosecutions, the area directly affected by
Younger v. Harris,an exception to what then existed of the abstention doctrine was created by the Court in 1908 in Ex parte Young. 13 In that decision
the Court indicated that under "extraordinary circumstances" a federal court

may properly enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution. 14 As to the factors necessary to constitute these exceptional circumstances, the Court indicated only that such circumstances would exist where the petitioner was
9 It has been said that the abstention doctrine began its initial development in a 1929
Supreme Court case, Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929).
See Maraist, supranote 8, at 538.
10 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
11 Id. at 501.
12 Congress has expressly provided for only three exceptions where federal courts
may grant injunctive relief against state court proceedings. Injunctive relief may be
granted where (1) expressly authorized by act of Congress; or (2) where necessary
to aid a federal court in its jurisdiction; or (3) to protect or effectuate the judgments
of a federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
A second major judicial exception, developed from the principles established in
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), has been commonly referred to as the "civil
rights" exception. In practical application this exception has frequently been difficult
to distinguish from the "extraordinary circumstances" exception. This is particularly
true where the danger to the exercise of civil rights results from a state criminal prose,cution. For a discussion of the former exception, see Maraist, supra note 8, at 548.
13 209 U.S. 123 (1908). At issue was the constitutionality of a state railroad rate
-statute. The Court held that the provisions of this statute concerning enforcement of
rates, "...
by imposing such enormous fines and possible imprisonment as a result of
an unsuccessful effort to test the validity of the laws themselves, are unconstitutional
-on their face...." Id. at 148.
14 The Court in Ex parte Young did not purport to establish any new rule, but rather
indicated that its conclusions were supported by long-standing case authority. The
Court quoted with approval from Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 12 (1890):
...
[T]he general doctrine . .. that the circuit courts of the United States will
restrain a state officer from executing an unconstitutional statute of the State,
when to execute it would violate rights and privileges of the complainant which
had been guaranteed by the Constitution, and would work irreparable damage
and injury to him, has never been departed from. 209 U.S. at 152.
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threatened with "great and irreparable injury" from an act that violates the
federal constitution.

15

Ex parte Young proved to be an unpopular decision, 16 and Congress reacted quickly by enacting legislation to restrict its effectiveness.1 The Court
in later decisions, while not rejecting the power it had granted itself in Ex
parte Young, merely refused to exercise that power by its persistent reluc8
tance to find that the facts presented created a danger of irreparable injury.'
Obviously the Court's attitude toward Ex parte Young severely limited the
development of guidelines whereby the existence of extraordinary circumstances warranting federal intervention might be determined. Nevertheless,
one factor-harassment and bad faith prosecution on the part of state officials-has consistently been considered by the Court to be an exceptional circumstance justifying federal court intervention.' 9 In no decision has this
been more evident than in Hague v. CIO, 20 decided in 1939. Here the Court,

refusing to abstain, granted declaratory and injunctive relief against the
mayor, police chief and other city officials of Jersey City, New Jersey where
the respondents were being harassed with prosecutions, unlawful searches
and arrests because of their labor union activities. The Court enjoined the
actions of the city officials and held that the ordinance under which they
purported to act was facially defective in forbidding public assembly and
distribution of literature in contravention of the respondent's right of free
speech and peaceful assembly. 2 1
While Hague v. CIO was not the first instance in which the Court was
faced with an overly broad or vague statute endangering the exercise of first
15Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167 (1908).
16See C. WRIGHT supra, note 8, at 186.
7Ex parte Young had a considerable influence on the passage in 1910 of an act which
forbade the issuance of a federal injunction against state proceedings or statutes, except
by a three-judge district court. The basic three-judge statute, -which has been subject
to amendment since its adoption, is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). See
Currie, The Three-Judge District Court In Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1 (1964). The three-judge court act was one of the less drastic measures proposed
to Congress following Ex parte Young. Some of the proposals sought to take away the
jurisdiction of federal courts to hear suits with regard to state laws. See C. WiuGsT,
supra note 8, at 188.
18See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943); Watson v. Buck,
313 U.S. 387, 401 (1941); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 50 (1941); Spielman
Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95 (1935); Fenner v. Boylin, 271 U.S. 240
(1926). But see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
19 Though denying injunctive relief against a state criminal prosecution, the Court
in Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 50 (941), indicated that multiple prosecutions
might constitute irreparable injury warranting intervention. See also Watson v. Buck,
313 U.S. 387 (1941).
20 307 U.S.496 (1939).
21 Id. at 516-18.
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amendment freedoms 2 2 it is unlikely that the Court could have forseen the
significant role this factor would play in future decisions with regard to federal court intervention in state court proceedings 23 By far the most important development in this area prior to Dombrowski v. Pfister did not occur
until some twenty-five years after Hague when the Court decided Baggett
v. Bullitt.24 In Baggett a class action was brought by members of the faculty,
staff and student body of the University of Washington seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief against a Washington state loyalty oath. 25 The Court
reversed a three-judge district court ruling and granted the prayed for relief. Justice White, speaking for the Court, indicated that because of the
vagueness of the statute it would require "extensive adjudication under a
variety of situations [to] bring the oath within the bounds of permissible
constitutional certainty."26 The Court found that the vagueness of the statute might inhibit the exercise of first amendment freedoms. 27 Justice White

went on to note that "abstention operates to require piecemeal adjudication
in many courts... thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for
an undue length of time.... , 23
22

See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242
(1937);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
23
See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitr, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Louisiana ex rel.
Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961). See also Comment, Protecting Civil
Liberties Through Federal Court Intervention in State Criminal Matters, 59 CALW. L.
REv. 1549, 1559 (1971); Notd, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 CoLUlm.
L. REv. 808 (1969).
24377 U.S. 360 (1964).
25 One of the Washington laws applied only to teachers, who before being accepted
for employment were required to swear that they would ".

.

. by precept and example

promote respect for the flag and the institutions of the United States of America and
the State of Washingtor, reverence for law and order and undivided allegiance to the
government of the United States."- WASH. LAWS 1931, ch. 377.
The second oath attacked, WASH. REv. CODE § 9.81.010 (1951), applied to any state
employment and required that any person applying for such a position disclaim being
a "subversive person" within WASH. REv. CODE § 9.81.010(5) (1951). A "subversive
person" within this code section was any person
... who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates,
abets, advises br teaches by any means any person to commit, attempt to commit,
or 'aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy or alter, or
to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the constitutional form
of government of the United States ... by revolution, force, or violence.-...
26 Baggett'v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378 (1964),
27 Id. at 379.
28 Id. at 378-9. This statement by the Court was in response to the state's argument
that Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.&.-496 (1941) required that the states be
given an opportunity to first resolve unsettled questions of state law. The state noted
that these statutes had never been construed. The Court indicated that this oath "is
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Although Baggett did not involve a pending criminal prosecution, that
fact did not preclude it from having a significant effect in that area; 2 for
as the Court in Dombrowski v. Pfister would later point out, where "protected freedoms of expression and association are similarly involved" there
is "no controlling distinction in the fact that the definition is used to provide
a standard of criminality rather than the contents of a test oath." 30
Prior to Dombrowski v. Pfister,Baggett and Hague v. CIO provided the
best indication of the factors necessary to obtain the relief sanctioned in Ex
parte Young. Briefly then, when Dombrowski came before the Court for
decision, any one of several factors might constitute exceptional circumstances warranting federal intervention in a pending state criminal prosecution. The petitioner might be deemed to have shown a threat of irreparable
injury that was both great and immediate if he alleged that he was threatened with harassment under the guise of a facially defective statute; 31 or
that he was threatened with prosecution under a vague or overly broad statute endangering the exercise of his first amendment rights;3 2 or finally, that
he was threatened with multiple prosecutions under an unconstitutionally
vague statute.8s
B. The Dombrowski Doctrine
The Court's growing concern over the protection of first amendment freedoms with regard to abstention was clearly evident in Dombrowski v.
Pfister.34 Dombrowski and his colleagues were arrested and their records
seized under two Louisiana communist control laws.3 5 The warrant was subnot open to one or a few interpretations, but to an indefinite number." 377 U.S. at
378.
29The Court in Baggett noted that under WASH. REV. CODE § 9.72.030 (1951) the

threat of criminal prosecution for perjury was always present where one made a false
oath. Id. at 374.

30 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965).
31 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
32

Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).

33 Id.

U.S. 479 (1965).
5The Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:358-74
(Supp. 1962). The Communist Propaganda Control Law, LA. REv. STAT. §§ 14:390-390.8
(Supp. 1962).
The appellants were charged with violation of the subversive activities act for
failing to register as members and officers of a communist front organization. 380 U.S.
479, 492-3 (1965). Dombrowski and one other colleague were charged with violating
the propaganda control law for failing to register as officers of a "subversive organization." Id. at 493. The Court found that since the definition of "subversive organiza34380
3

tion" in the Louisiana act was almost identical to that in Baggett v. Bullitt, it was

invalid for the same reasons. The Court further found that registration requirements
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sequently quashed and the seized evidence suppressed. State officials, however, continued to threaten the appellants with prosecution and a state indictment soon followed. Dombrowski alleged that because the statute under
which he was being prosecuted was facially vague and overbroad, it was
susceptible to unlawful application abridging his right to freedom of expression; that the state officials were proceeding with no hope of securing
a conviction; that the sole purpose of the state action was to harass him and
his colleagues in their civil rights activities; and finally, that the state action,
had frightened away potential members and contributors to his organization
and paralyzed its operations. 36 Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court,
reaffirmed the principles justifying federal nonintervention in state court
proceedings,3 7 but noted that

.... the allegations in this complaint depict a situation in which defense
of the State's criminal prosecution will not assure adequate vendication
of constitutional rights. They suggest that a substantial loss or impairment of freedoms of expression will occur if appellants must await the
state court's disposition and ultimate review in this Court of any adverse
determination. These allegations, if true, clearly show irreparable in8
jury.
No doubt the Court was justified in finding that the facts alleged warranted intervention. Unfortunately, however, Justice Brennan did not confine his remarks to the particular facts present. He went on to intimate that
intervention would be justified where the exercise of first amendment rights
were in danger of being "chilled" by a facially vague or overbroad statute
or by multiple prosecutions.3 9 Essentially from Justice Brennan's remarks it
could be inferred that in the future extraordinary circumstances warranting
intervention might be found in any state proceeding resulting in a "chilling
effect" upon the exercise of first amendment freedoms. 40
of the subversive activities act were invalid because it did not provide for the pro-

cedural safeguards required in Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
(1951).
36

The appellants were members and officers of the Southern Conference Educational

Fund, an organization that actively participated in the Negro civil rights movement.
380 U.S. at 482.
37 380 U.S. at 483-85.
aBId. at 485-86.
39 Clearly the facts present in Dombrowski constituted more than a mere "chilling

effect" upon the exercise of first amendment freedoms. Not only were the statutes
under which the appellants were being prosecuted facially unconstitutional, see note
34 supra, but the appellants were subjected to constant damaging harassment by state
officials. Justice Brennan's remarks that the very fact of prosecution may have a "chilling
effect" upon the exercise of first amendment rights assumes facts far less damaging
than those actually present. 380 US. at 487.
40 Id. at 487.
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Dombrowski's broad pronouncements were soon hailed by civil libertarians
and constitutional scholars alike as an indication that this decision marked a
substantial departure from traditional abstention considerations. 41 Supreme
Court decisions that followed served only to support this view by their failure
to positively respond to the apparent speculation over Dombrowski.42 Many
lower federal courts, for lack of clear authority to the contrary, felt that
Dombrowski had severely restricted the abstention doctrine in the area of
first amendment freedoms. 43 Briefly, these courts interpreted Dombrowski
and subsequent decisions as indicating that under the extraordinary circum41 See generally Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type Suit as an Effective Weapon for
Social Change: Reflections From Without and Within, 18 KAN. L. REv. 237 (1970);
Stickgold, Variations on The Theme of Dombrowski v. Pfister: Federal Intervention
in State Criminal Proceedings Affecting First Amendment Rights, 1968 Wis. L. Rxv.
369 (1968).
42
In Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965), the Court in a per curiam opinion
indicated that it regarded Dombrowski as having significance beyond its own facts.
The Court vacated a three-judge district court ruling, rendered prior to Dombrowski,
refusing to grant injunctive relief against the enforcement of a Mississippi anti-picketing
statute. The Court remanded the case to the district court so that it might be considered
in light of Dombrowski v. Pfister. Justice Black, who was later to write the opinions
of the Court in Younger and its companion cases, wrote a lengthy dissent to the dismissal. Black noted: "Apparently the Court means to indicate that this recent decision
[Dombrowski v. Pfister] created a new rule authorizing federal courts to enjoin state
officers from enforcing state laws. . . ." Id. at 747.
In Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), the appellant sought declaratory relief
from a New York statute regulating the distribution of handbills. The Court in holding
the statute void for overbreadth noted that it might produce a "chilling effect" on the
appellant's first amendment rights. Id. at 252.
But when Cameron returned for the second time the Court retreated from the position taken in Dombrowski and Zwickler. See Cameron v. Johnson. 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
On remand the three-judge court had again refused to grant relief against the antipicketing statute. The Court, in affirming, indicated that a "chilling effect" on first
amendment freedoms was permissible so long as state officials were proceeding in good
faith to enforce a valid statute. Id. at 619. This position on the part of the Court has
been criticized as permitting "state officials to harass the exercise of protected expression
so long as they have an expectation of obtaining conviction." See Stickgold, supra
note 41, at 412.
43See, e.g., Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040
(1969); Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (W.D.N.C. 1971); Babbitz v. McCann,
320 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated and -remanded, 402 US. 903 (1971); cf.
Livingston v. Garmire, 437 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 442 F.2d 1322
(5th Cir. 1971); Soglin v. Kauffman, 419 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969); Tyrone, Inc. v.
Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir.),-cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969); Baxter v. Ellington, 318 F. Sujpp. 1079 (E.D. Tenn. 1970). Contra, King v. Adams, 410 F.2d 455 (5th
Cir. 1969); Tyler v. Russel, 410 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1969); Townsend v. State of Ohio,
366 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1966); Ivy v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.), cert. -denied,
382 U.S. 958 (1965); Grove Press, Inc. v. Bailey, 318 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
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stances exception irreparable injury that was both great and immediate would
exist where the complainant could prove either (1) bad faith prosecution, 44
(2) the existence of a facially vague or overbroad statute resulting in a "chilling effect" upon the exercise of first amendment rights,45 or (3) a "chilling
effect" upon first amendment freedoms that would not be remedied by state
46
court adjudication.
Those who sought to apply Dombrowski to areas unrelated to freedom of
expression met with little success absent proof of bad faith prosecution or
harassment. 47 With respect to first amendment rights, however, the criteria
established by Dombrowskiwas obviously capable of very broad application.
This was clearly evident in many lower federal cases as the mere mention of
a "chilling effect" or freedom of expression frequently prompted federal intervention. 48 Speculation over the ultimate extremes to which Dombrowski
might be carried, at least with respect to pending state criminal prosecutions,
was to come to an unexpected halt in February, 1971 when the Court de49
cided Younger v. Harrisand its companion cases.
II. YOUNGER AND ITS COMPANION CASES

In Younger v. Harris0 a three-judge federal court, relying on Dombrowski, had held California's Criminal Syndicalism Act51 void for vagueness and
44
See, e.g., Astro Cinema Corp., Inc. v. Mackell, 422 F.2d 293 (2d Cit. 1970); Grove
Press, Inc. v. Bailey, 319 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ala. 1970); Washington v. Garmire, 317
F. Supp. 1384, (S.D. Fla. 1970) vacated and remanded, 442 F.2d 1322 (5th Cit. 1971);
Gordon v. Christenson, 317 F. Supp. 146 (D. Utah 1970).
45See, e.g., LeFlore v. Robinson, 434 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1970), vacated, 446 F.2d 715
(5th Cir. 1971); Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567 (1st Cit. 1970); Moreno v. Henckel,
431 F.2d 1299 (5th Cit. 1970); Stanler v. Willis, 415 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970); Baxter v. Ellington, 318 F. Supp. 1079 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
46See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922
(1969); Gordon v. Christenson, 317 F. Supp. 146 (D. Utah 1970).
47 See, e.g., Hall v. New York, 359 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1966) (defendant prosecuted for
sodomy); Nichols v. Vance, 293 F. Supp. 680 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (prosecution for murder); Burhoe v. Byrne, 285 F. Supp. 382 (D. Mass. 1968) (receiving stolen liquor).
4
sSee, e.g., Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Babbitz v.
McCann, 320 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated and renzanded, 402 U.S. 903 (1971);
Washington v. Garmire, 317 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D. Fla. 1970), vacated and remanded, 442
F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1971). Cf. Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969);
Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969).
49
See cases cited note 2 supra.
50401 U.S. 37 (1971).
51 CALZ.PENAL CODE § 11400-01 (West 1967). The full text of this act may be found
at 401 U.S. 37, 38-39. Briefly, however, it provides that any person who teaches or aids
or publicizes or justifies or commits any act of criminal syndicalism is guilty of a

felony. "Criminal syndicalism" is defined as

".

..

any doctrine or precept ...

teaching

or aiding and abetting the commission of crime '..'. or unlawful acts' of force and
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overbreadth in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments and had enjoined further prosecution under the act.5 2 In reversing the district court,
the late Justice Black, speaking for the Court, wasted little time in establishing that Dombrowski should not be regarded as ".

.

. having upset the settled

doctrines that have always confined very narrowly the availability of injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions." 5 Justice Black pointed out
that the mere showing that a state statute was facially vague or overbroad
in violation of first amendment freedoms, or that it might produce a "chilling effect" on those freedoms, absent proof of bad faith or harassment is insufficient to justify intervention. 54 The presence of a "chilling effect," said
Black, "....

even in the area of first amendment rights, has never been con-

sidered a sufficient basis, in and of itself, for prohibiting state action." ,5
violence or . . . terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change." See Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp.
508 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
507,
52
Harris had been indicted for distributing leaflets in violation of the act. Several
other plaintiffs intervened in the suit alleging that they were members of the Progressive
Labor Party, an organization supporting change in industrial ownership and political
change. These plaintiffs contended that the prosecution of Harris and the presence of
the statute inhibited them in their advocacy. See Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507,
509 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
The three-judge court, citing Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943),
noted that ordinarily a federal court may not properly intervene in state criminal
prosecutions, for if constitutional issues are involved they may be considered by the
United States Supreme Court after all state remedies have been exhausted. In reference
to Dombrowski v. Pfister, the district court went on to say, however, that ". . . in recent
years, exceptions to this rule have been applied when the criminal statute inherently
has a limiting effect upon free expression and when, as here, it is susceptible to unduly
broad application." 281 F. Supp. at 510.
The district court pointed out that its ruling did not pass on the right of those not
facing prosecution to attack the validity of the statute. Id. at 516. Justice Black, however, stated that those plaintiffs other than Harris had no standing to question the
validity of the statute. He noted that ". . . persons having no fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as appropriate
plaintiffs in such cases [i.e. federal lawsuits to enjoin a prosecution in a state court]."
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971).
53 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971).
54d. at 50, 53. Justice Black noted that federal injunctive relief does not always
eliminate the "chilling effect" that may result from state prosecution; that as Dombrowski pointed out, such injunctions should be removed as soon as the objectionable
clauses were given an acceptable interpretation by the state courts. The result, said
Black, is that the uncertainty remains for those who fear criminal prosecution under
the statute. Id. at 50-51.
55 Id. at 51. The Court stated that
[wihere a statute does not directly abridge free speech, but-while regulating a
subject within the State's power-tends to have the incidental effect of inhibiting
First Amendment rights, it is well settled that the statute can be upheld if the
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Despite its critical attitude, the Court by no means intended to overrule
Dombrowski;rather Black indicated that intervention was clearly warranted
on the facts present in that case.56 The Court, when confronted with Dombrowski's broad assertions, noted simply that they were unnecessary to that
7
decisionY
In Younger the Court did not rule out the possibility that there could exist
extraordinary circumstances in the absence of bad faith and harassment that
would justify intervention. 58 Little doubt was left, however, that in the future the circumstances alleged would indeed have to be very special. Black
noted that such circumstances might exist where the statute was "flagrantly
and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause,
sentence and paragraph...." 51Justice Stewart in a concurring opinion indicated that state officials would have to use bad faith and harassment in enforcement or that the statute would have to be "patently and flagrantly unconstitutional on its face" to warrant intervention. 60
Samunels v. MackelI0 was the second in the series of five cases decided with
Younger. Samuels involved a factual situation similar to that of Younger.
The appellants sought an injunction, or in the alternative, declaratory relief
against enforcement of a New York state criminal anarchy statute. The
Court stated that the appellants had failed to show that they would suffer
irreparable injury from the prosecution, accordingly under the criteria established in Younger injunctive relief was denied.62 Justice Black, turning to
the alternative prayer for declaratory relief, remarked that abstention was
proper here as well, since
... ordinarily a declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same
interference with and disruption of state proceedings that the longstanding policy limiting injunctive relief was designed to avoid.63
effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct and
the lack of alternative means for doing so. Id.
56 Id.at 4849.
57The statements were unnecessary, said the Court, because "the plaintiffs had alleged a basis for equitable relief under the long-established standards." Id. at 50.
58 Id.at 53.

59Id.
60 401 U.S. 37, 56 (Stewart, J., concurring).
61401 U.S. 66 (1971).
62 Id. at 68.
63 Id. at 72. Black indicated, however, that just because it was determined that the
injunctive relief was improper in a particular case, it should not be assumed that declaratory relief is automatically precluded. Without giving any specific examples, Black
noted:
There may be unusual circumstances in which an injunction might be withheld
because, despite a plaintiftfs strong claim for relief under the established standards,
the injunctive remedy seemed particularly intrusive or offensive; in such a
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In Perez v. Ledesmay14 a third companion case decided with Younger, a
three-judge federal district court suppressed the use of allegedly obscene materials seized by state officers. The Court, in setting aside the suppression
order, held that Younger prohibited interference with any phase of a pending state criminal prosecution, including evidence obtained by state officers'
in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.6 5
In the few months since Younger and its companion cases were decided
their impact on lower federal court decisions with respect to pending state
criminal prosecutions has been profound. In most of these decisions requests
for injunctive and declaratory relief have been summarily dismissed. 6 It is
important to observe that the courts are apparently confining Younger
strictly to criminal prosecutions.6 7 Overburdened district courts, who had
situation, a declaratory judgment might be appropriate and might not be contrary to the basic equitable doctrines governing the availability of relief. Id. at 73.
64401 U.S. 82 (1971).
65 Of the lower court's suppression order, the Court noted that "...
[i]t is difficult
to imagine a more disruptive interference with the operation of the state criminal
process short of an injunction against all state proceedings." Id. at 84. The Court
observed that it appeared the state officials were merely acting in good faith to enforce
the state's criminal laws. Id. at 85.
In addition to the cases discussed in this Comment, the Court decided two other
cases closely associated with Younger. See Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971);
Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). In both per curiam decisions relief was denied
on the basis of Younger and Sanuels. Though these decisions contribute little to the
principles established in the rulings discussed, they do serve to support the significance
of Younger and Sanzuels.
66In the areas affected, the issuance of federal injunctions and declaratory relief
since Younger has been almost nonexistent. Younger v. Harris has virtually replaced
Dombrowski as authority in this area. See, e.g., Livingston v. Garmire, 442 F.2d 1322
(5th Cir. 1971); Coleman v. Yokum, 442 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1971); Locks v. Laird,
441 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1971); Rialto Theatre Co. v. City of Wilmington, 440 F.2d
1326 (3d Cir. 1971); Eve Prod., Inc. v. Shannon, 439 F.2d 1073 (8th Cit. 1971); Woodruff v. Wrest Virginia Bd. of Regents, 382 F. Supp. 1023 (S.D. W. Va. 1971); Conover
v. Montemuro, 328 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390
(E.D. La. 1971); Pederson v. Breier, 327 F. Supp. 1382 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Nelson, 327 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Ariz. 1971); Alga, Inc. v. Crosland,
327 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Kirk v. McMeen, 327 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Iowa
1971); Hearn v. Short, 327 F. Supp. 33 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Veen v. Davis, 326 F. Supp.
116 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Hendricks v. Hogan, 324 F. Supp. 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Lewis
v. Kugler, 324 F. Supp. 1220 (D.N.J. 1971); Lawrence v. Lordi, 324 F. Supp. 1092
(D.N.J. 1971).
67 See, e.g., Hull v. Petrillo, 439 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir. 1971) (criminal prosecution not
pending); Kennan v. Warren, 328 F. Supp. 525 (W.D. Wis. 1971) (state administrative
proceeding); Anderson v. Vaughn, 327 F. Supp. 101 (D. Conn. 1971) (criminal prosecution not pending); Kennan v. Nichol, 326 F. Supp. 613 (W.D. Wis. 1971) (prosecution not yet commenced); C'est Bon, Inc. v. North Carolina State Bd. of AlcoholicControl, 325 F. Supp. 404 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (liquor license suspension).
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for six years struggled with the intricacies and inconsistences of Dombrowski
obviously welcomed Younger, and rightly so, for though the latter decision
failed to provide them with well defined guidelines to follow, it did offer
substantial relief from a mounting case load caused in part by Dombrowski.
The language of the Younger Court was sufficient to indicate that in the future truly exceptional circumstances would have to be alleged to warrant
intervention 6 8 The significance of Younger, then, is that very few plaintiffs
threatened with state criminal prosecution will be able to allege facts sufficient to justify federal intervention. 9 Indeed, those who have succeeded
since Younger have done so only by proving bad faith prosecution and
harassment on the part of state officials. 70
III. CONCLUSION

With respect to pending state criminal prosecutions, Younger v. Harris
and its companion cases have reaffirmed the doctrine of comity-that federal
courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, should give consideration to the
sovereign status of the individual state. 71 Though Younger does not provide
all the answers, its effect on the Dombrovski doctrine is such that only the
issue of whether such a valid doctrine continues to exist in areas not affected
by Younger remains in doubt. Concern over the continued validity of Dombrowski, however, in those areas not affected by Younger may be purely
academic, for certainly if Dombrowski is to be confined to its particular facts
the Court will, as the opportunities arise, hold as it did in Younger.
No doubt Younger will prove to be a wise decision. Dombrowski served
only to increase the discord between the federal and state judiciary. The
assumption that the state courts are adequately equipped to expeditiously
vindicate the rights of the accused is a sound one. The principles enunciated
7in Dombrowski v. Pfister, carried to their logical extreme, could eventually
place such a burden on the federal courts that the evil sought to be avoided
in one judicial system would exist in another, from which there would beno
.recourse.
D.E.E.

68See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
69 See, e.g., Duncan v. Perez, 445 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971); Hull v. Petrillo, 439 F.2d
1184 (2d Cir. 1971); Montgomery County Bd. of Educ. v. Shelton, 327 F. Supp. 811
(ND. Miss. 1971).
70 See note 66 supra.
, 71 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
See also Comment, Protecting Civil
Liberties Through Federal Court Intervention in State Criminal Matters, 59 CALIF. L.
REv. 1549, 1550 (1971).

